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Squashed

A blog of politics, law, religion, and the tricky spots where they collide.

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Posts tagged foreclosure:

“The process is broken.”

I’m still simmering over this old Morning Edition story lamenting Florida’s foreclosure process. Before declaring a process is broken, a responsible journalist ought to ask two questions:

  1. What are the goals of the process?
  2. Are those goals being accomplished?

If the answer to that second question is “yes,” the process isn’t broken. It doesn’t mean it’s a good process—but identifying the reason for the process is important if you’re going to ask whether there might be a better way to go about it.

In this case, the story unreflectively blames a “cumbersome legal process” and “unscrupulous foreclosure [defense] attorneys.” There doesn’t seem to be much desire to discuss whether that process has prevented people from losing their homes who should not lose their homes. Or whether those “unscrupulous” attorneys have meritorious claims. If the homeowners actually defaulted on the loan, lenders actually followed the rules, and the lenders actually showed up and competently presented their case—it could be over in a tenth of the time it takes. But for some reason things keep dragging out and homeowners keep winning these suits. Perhaps there’s a better explanation than “process is broken.” It could be that the indigent homeowners just have magical attorneys who are way better than anything the lenders money can buy. Or maybe the homeowners actually have a case worth vindicating.

Most borrowers affected by mortgage-related abuses won’t get a big payout

shortformblog:

  • <$1000payout received by settlement to an average borrower victimized by banks’ alleged mortgage-related abuses. Federal regulators slated 1,135 people who’d lost their homes, most of them members of the military, to receive a bigger piece of the $3.6 billion pie — $125,000 for each. For 80% of those being compensated, however, the return won’t be so rich. source

The Wall Street Journal’s take on this is a little strange to me. Here’s the lead:

The vast majority of borrowers being compensated for mortgage-related abuses will get less than $1,000 apiece, a sobering coda to a protracted attempt to help those who may have been placed into foreclosure as a result of banks’ mistakes.

A paragraph later, you get to this:

Another 53 borrowers were found to have lost their homes despite not actually defaulting on their loans.

So … wait. These guys foreclosed on fifty-three homes of people who had not defaulted on their mortgage? Why isn’t that the headline? (Those 53 and about a thousand others will receive payments of $125,000. This is in addition to whatever they recover in any lawsuits they bring.)

The reason most of the payments are “less than $1,000 apiece” is that the payments are going to four million borrowers. I know as well as anybody that the lenders screw things up on a pretty epic scale. But when you have relief that broad, you shouldn’t expect the median payout to be particularly high. There was a whole range of abuses. The most common ones were less clearly tied to the ultimate harm.

I like to keep this parade of links to gigantic and expensive settlements by our titans of finance coming so people can remember them when they’re tempted to say that nobody is being held accountable for the financial crisis. This half billion is on top of a previous $8.5 billion settlement. That was on top of a recent $25 billion settlement.

Banking regulators are close to a $10 billion settlement with 14 banks that would end the government’s efforts to hold lenders responsible for foreclosure abuses like faulty paperwork and excessive fees that may have led to evictions, according to people with knowledge of the discussions.

Settlement Expected on Past Abuses in Home Loans

This is in addition to the previous $25 billion from the larger servicers.. To put those numbers in context, $10 billion is about the total market capitalization for a company the size of Sony.

Foreclosure Moratorium

Spain has implemented a two-year, limited moratorium on evicting low-income former owners after foreclosure. Predictably, The Callus and I disagree on whether this is good policy.1 Let’s start with a few points that are either uncontroversial or very well established.

  • We’re in the middle of a period of record high home foreclosures. This is horrible for everybody for a whole lot of reasons.
  • The current crisis wasn’t caused by any change in borrower behavior. People are roughly as responsible or irresponsible as they have always been.
  • Much of the crisis was caused by illegal lending practices. The lenders have settled billions and billions of dollars in lawsuits over this stuff. The lending institutions that are still around today created the incentives that caused these illegal loans, made a ton of money off them in the run up to the crisis, and either knew what was happening or would have known what was happening if they had listened to their own quality control units. In other words, the lenders were largely at fault for the bad loans.
  • A lot of the crisis is caused by the unemployment crisis, which was caused by the financial collapse, which was caused by the actions of the same lenders. To be clear, I’m not saying we should soak the lenders because they have it coming. I’m simply saying that the lenders aren’t innocent bystanders. While I’m more interested in solutions than punitive measures, there is nothing unfair about a solution that asks the lenders to bear a reasonable share of the costs.
  • Home values are way down.
  • Home vacancies are way up. This has led to a whole variety of blight.
  • Homelessness and housing insecurity are also way up.

I should also emphasize that owning a home costs a lot less than fair market rent for a similarly sized property. (Landlords have all the same costs homeowners do—except they also need to cover for any time a property is vacant or occupied by somebody who isn’t paying rent. They would also like to profit.) Homeownership also has a ton of positive externalities. Practically speaking, the alternative to homeownership for many people is either subsidized housing or some variety of homelessness. Evictions cost public resources.

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“Repeat” Foreclosures

Barticles has linked to a CATO Article that misses some important points:

More Than Half of Foreclosures Now ‘Repeats’

If there is one policy lesson we should take away from the foreclosure crisis, it is that delaying the inevitable makes the problem worse.  Had these borrowers finished the foreclosure process the first time around, housing prices would have adjusted quicker and the housing market would have also been on the road to recovery quicker.  These families would also not be stuck in “limbo” and would have been able to move on with their lives.  While some have argued that delaying these adjustments was appropriate, it is far from clear to me that longer periods operating under “false” prices will lead to better market outcomes.

This is something I know a few things about—but I’ll try to limit myself to three quick points and a broad observation.

First, the data comes from Lender Processing Services (LPS). This is a company that purports to streamline the foreclosure process, mostly by taking shortcuts with the law. They are a large part of the robosigning scandal. They are also part of why a lot of the lenders are losing their judicial foreclosure states. Their approach has consistently been that they would rather do something quickly and cheaply than do it right. This doesn’t mean that the data is unreliable—but there is likely a connection between how many mortgages’ foreclosures are started on but neither finished nor resolved in a stable way and how much LPS sucks at what it does.

Second, it’s interesting that many of the false-start foreclosures are in judicial foreclosure states. These are states where the lender has to actually go in front of a judge. Most cases result in default judgement—so it’s practically a rubber stamping process. But for whatever reason the lenders can’t get through that rubber stamp review. The attorneys prosecuting foreclosures aren’t known for their bleeding hearts. But they are, on rare occasion, willing to tell lenders that this foreclosure is so obviously illegal that they’re not willing to risk their license. These are the errors detected in the judicial foreclosure states where there’s at least nominally a cop on the beat. Can you imagine how many errors go undetected in non-judicial foreclosure states?

Third, the data offered by CATO doesn’t inquire into why the first foreclosure stopped and the second started. I can offer a bit of insight. Some of it is cases where the borrower reinstated the loan by, for example, cashing out a 401K. Some of it was cases where the lender realized it shouldn’t have started the process and reversed course. (The lender then typically bills the borrower $4,000 for the foreclosure it negligently started.) A lot of it is cases where a bankruptcy stay interrupted the process. In a few cases, the double hit is caused by some sort of double tragedy to the borrowers. For example, the first foreclosure was caused by a job loss. Things got worked out, were stable for a while, then there was a divorce. For the most part, though, the double foreclosure start happened because some sort of stable workout was possible that would allow the borrowers to stay in their home and the lender opted to go with some crappy, temporary approach that didn’t solve the underlying problem.

Finally, a general observation. Look at that final line:

While some have argued that delaying these adjustments was appropriate, it is far from clear to me that longer periods operating under “false” prices will lead to better market outcomes.

So … these are people’s homes. I feel a bit ill every time somebody suggests that we should care more about reaching a rapid market equilibrium than we should care about the lives of people who are losing their homes. The idea that we should tolerate illegal or unnecessary foreclosures either because it takes too much effort to do everything correctly or because justice is the sort of luxury poor people can’t afford nauseates me. Maybe I have a weak stomach.

Don’t try and stop the foreclosure process. Let it run its course and hit the bottom, allow investors to buy homes, put renters in them, fix the homes up and let it turn around and come back up. The Obama administration has slow-walked the foreclosure processes that have long existed and as a result we still have a foreclosure overhang.

Mitt Romney

Trying to stop the foreclosure process is sort of what I do—and I’ve got some serious concerns about Romney’s statement. It’s not just that this is sort of a jerk thing to say. None of us thought Romney cared a whole lot about the very poor. The surprising part is Romney’s lack of knowledge, lack of interest, and lack of sound priorities.

I’ll give Romney some credit for knowing that the foreclosure processes “have long existed.” But that’s it. The Obama administration wasn’t slow-walking the process—it was just asking that it be followed. As it turns out, the mortgage servicers were skipping some of the important steps “that have long existed.” Like the step where you make sure you own the home you were foreclosing on. All fifty state attorney generals investigated this, as did the department of justice. A settlement was reached between with the five biggest servicers and forty-nine of the states. The lenders agreed to pay $25 billion dollars for their bad behavior. That’s billion. As in, “The annual GDP of Vermont is about $26.4 Billion.” This is just one of many settlements connected with this. So when Romney is saying, “Let the process take its course,” he’s essentially saying, “Don’t go after the big banks for breaking the law. That’s bad for the bank’s stockholders. Instead, let them steal people’s houses.” So that’s not cool.

Then there’s the “Let it run its course and hit the bottom” bit. I understand that sometimes it’s best to get something painful over with. Rip off the bandaid. But this assumes the stakes are relatively low. If ripping off the bandaid would take your face with it, maybe you don’t want to do that. Allowing preventable foreclosure has consequences. People live in the houses Romney wants to see foreclosed. They will be homeless. But that’s just the beginning of the problem. It means fragile communities lose members. It means properties are left vacant, even as homelessness increases. It means increased crime due to unsecured, vacant buildings. It means neighbors lose home values and cities lose tax revenue. It means the kids who were living in the homes have to move to new school districts and leave their friends. The human cost is far higher than the cost to Romney’s investment portfolio.

And how do we feel about investors buying homes, putting renters in them, and fixing them up? First, “fixing them up?” Yeah, right. It doesn’t happen. Maybe if a guy buys a house. But the large scale investors aren’t doing expensive repairs. That’s a loser’s game. In practice, these “investors” are most likely to be crappy, absentee landlords. Second, Romney’s voiced a preference for renting homes rather than owning them. This is both far more expensive for the renters and means that any future appreciation in the home values goes to the investor. It’s a massive shift in anticipated wealth from the middle class to the rich.

Finally, Romney’s plan is a fiscal disaster for the U.S.. Many of those loans being foreclosed are, in one capacity or another, owned or guaranteed by the U.S. government. Romney’s plan is essentially buy-high sell-low for tax payers and buy-low sell-high for his investors. He wants to see the housing market crash to the bottom, unload a bunch of U.S. assets there, and then let private individuals ride the market back up.

Also, he thinks you should make him President.

A plan by San Bernardino County to seize mortgages and restructure them for underwater homeowners using eminent domain is perhaps the most aggressive example of how local governments are seeking new ways to combat foreclosure.

L.A. Times

So … that proposal was made.

There was no testimony and no trial. Citigroup admitted wrongdoing on Feb. 15 and paid the $158.3 million to settle.

Bloomberg: Woman Who Couldn’t Be Intimidated By Citigroup Wins $31 Million

Citigroup admitted approving loans for government insurance that didn’t qualify under Federal Housing Administration rules. Prosecutors kept open the possibility of bringing criminal charges, without specifying targets.

The article recounts massive complicity in fraud perpetrated by CitiMortgage. Essentially, Citi packaged a bunch of mortgages for government insurance, ignored a bunch of defects, and left taxpayers on the hook for its mess. These defective mortgages are one of the primary causes of the collapse.

A few takeaways:

  1. Mortgage fraud was committed by both the little players (who you expect to commit the occasional fraud) and the huge players, who should be able to control for that sort of thing.
  2. The Department of Justice is prosecuting the guys who caused the financial crisis. $158.3 million is a bee sting for Citi. But this is just one of many suits for similar stuff. When you combine that with the $25 billion settlement and a heap of other outstanding liability, it gets very significant.
  3. Check it out. The Dodd-Frank Act did something.
  4. Not every Department of Justice would aggressively prosecute this sort of thing. The DoJ’s willingness to go over corporate wrongdoing depends a lot on who is President and who that President appoints as Attorney General.
  5. Could we get a showing of hands from everybody who believes that the Republican’s obsessive desire to bring down Attorney General Holder is completely disconnected with Holder’s willingness to bring suits against the financial industry?

Could you help me with a metaphor?

I’m working on training a few attorneys on foreclosure prevention law. One of the major points I want to emphasize is that the goal isn’t to simply extend a homeowner’s stay a few months or to help them leave their homes on their own terms with a modicum of dignity. And it’s definitely not to shepherd them to help them understand the process in hopes that a better comprehension of why they will lose their home will keep the machine running smoothly. The goal is to stop the foreclosure forever and keep people in their homes on affordable terms.

Unfortunately, I tend to explain things like this in metaphorical terms. And the one I’m stuck on is apparently too graphic. Could you help me come up with a more palatable alternative to “I’m not trying to design a more humane slaugherhouse?”

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